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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES B. JOHNSTON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Respondent. 
MAUREEN H. SIMPSON and WAYNE 
SIMPSON, dba The Flight 
School, 
Defendants, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 16859 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT THE FEDERAL 
AVIATION ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE LAW IN DETERMINING 
PRIORITY OF INTERESTS IN AIRCRAFT. 
The Respondent (Plaintiff below) primarily relies 
upon Dowell v. Beach Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal.3d 544, 91 
Cal. Rptr. 1, 476 P.2d 401 (1970) for the proposition that 
the Federal Aviation Act in providing for the registration 
of documents affecting the title to or any interest in civil 
aircraft in the United States preempts state law and is the 
sole determining factor in determining priority of interests 
-1-
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in aircraft. Dowell specifically so holds. Dowell was the first 
case to squarely face the preemption question and hold in 
favor of the development of federal priorities. 19 St. 
Louis Univ. L.J. 122 at 134. Dowell has been soundly 
criticized. 19 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 122; Bitzer Croft 
Motors v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, 401 N.E. 2d 1340 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways 
Enterprises, 580 s.w. 2d 491 (Ken. 1979); Bank of 
Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, 571 S.W. 2d 
152 (Ct. App. Tenn 1977). Only one case has been found 
which follows Dowell and that was an intermediate appellate 
court decision in Florida. O'Neill v. Barnett Bank 
360 So.2d 150 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1978). A sister division 
of the same court subsequently refused to follow that case. 
Michigan National Bank v. Maierhoffer, 382 So.2d 318 (Dist. 
Ct. App. Fla. 1979). All other cases subsequent to Dowell 
dealing with this issue appear to have held that the Federal 
Aviation Act does not preempt state law dealing with the 
issue of priorities among competing interests in aircraft. 
Bitzer Croft Motors v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, supra; 
Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, supra; 
Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, supra; 
Michigan National Bank v. Maierhoffer, supra. Thus the 
Kentucky Supreme Court in Cessna Finance Corp., holds: 
-2-
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Cessna Finance contends that the Federal 
Aviation Act, 49 u.s.c. Sec. 1403, preempts 
all state laws governing priorities among per-
fected security interests. we do not agree. 
The purpose of Congress in enacting the 
Federal Aviation Act was to establish a 
single national filing system for the 
recording of documents evidencing title and 
security interests in pivil aircraft and not 
to legislate priorities among holders of 
various interests in aircraft. H.R. Rep. No. 
2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Reprinted in 
{1958) u. s. Code & Admin. News, pp. 3741, 
3750, 3755; H.R. Rep. No. 9738, 75th Cong., 3d 
Sess., 405-407 {1938). E. g., Henson, Secured 
Transactions 22 {1979). Congress did not 
intend to supercede state laws that would 
otherwise govern the priorities between per-
fected security interests. Haynes v. General 
Elec. Credit Corp., W.D.Va., 432 F.Supp. 763, 
765-767 {1977), Affirmed C.A.4th, 582 F.2d 869 
{1978) {per curiam); Sanders v. M. D. 
Aircraft Sales, Inc., C.A.3d, 575 F.2d 1086 
{1978); see also Malone v. White Motor Corp., 
435 U.S. 497, 98 s.ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 
{ 19 7 8 ) • { FN 5 ) 
FN5. Cessna Finance relies on Dowell v. Beech 
Acceptance Corp., Inc., 3 Cal.3d 544, 91 
Cal.Rptr. 1, 476 P.2d 401 {1970), cert. 
denied, 404 u.s. 823, 92 s.ct. 45, 30 
L.Ed.2d 50 {1971) for the proposition that, 
because of the federal preemption of the 
priority issue, a buyer in the ordinary course 
of business from a retail dealer does not 
take free of a prior federally recorded 
security interest created by that dealer. 
This is the Only case to so hold. Sigman, The 
Wild Blue Yonder: Interests in Aircraft Under 
Our Federal System, 46 So.Cal.L.Rev. 316, 
339-348 {1973). Because it misapprehends the 
Act's legislative history and misapplies the 
standards for application of the preemption 
doctrine, we choose to allow it to remain one 
of a kind. 
-3-
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And the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Bank of Hendersonville 
analyzes the issue as follows: 
California appears to stand alone in its 
insistence that a customer who buys an 
airplane out of the stock of a dealer must 
carry out a ''title search'' for recorded 
''floor plan'' liens. 
This Court prefers to follow the rule 
announced in all other jurisdictions that the 
rights of a purchaser from a dealer in ordi-
nary course of business are superior to the 
holder of a lien upon a moving stock of planes 
in the hands of a dealer. There are a number 
of reasons why this decision is preferable. 
1. The Uniform Commercial Code has brought 
uniformity and order to the field of commer-
cial law. To graft a new class of exceptions 
upon the existing uniform law would reverse 
the wholesome intent and result of the law. 
2. It is not reasonable to assume that 
Congress intended any such result where not 
clearly stated. 
3. The proliferation of aircraft dealerships 
and aircraft purchases would be seriously 
hampered if the public were not allowed to 
trust dealers selling in ordinary course of 
business. 
4. It is inequitable and unjust to allow a 
mortgagee to hold ''secret liens'' on chat-
tels while authorizing the chattels to be 
exhibited for sale by a dealer to the decep-
tion and loss of the purchasing public. 
5. Lienholders may protect themselves (if they 
desire) by impounding the mortgaged planes in 
locked surroundings inconsistent with the 
free-sale situation of a stock of 
merchandise. 
-4-
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These cases are well reasoned and should be followed by the 
court in the instant case. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT RECEIVED GOOD TITLE ON THE DATE OF PURCHASE AND 
THE SELLERS' WARRANTY OF TITLE WAS NOT BREACHED. 
Respondent fails to note in his brief that on 
October 17, 1977, the date of purchase, {Trial Court's 
Finding No. l} the date on which title was to pass, {Trial 
Court's Finding No. 2} there were no title documents on file 
with the FAA whatsoever (Trial Court's Finding No. 3}. The 
Federal Aviation Act specifically provides that "no con-
veyance or instrument, the recording of which is provided 
for by subsection {a} of this section shall be valid. • • 
against any person other than the person by whom the con-
veyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or 
devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until 
such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation 
in the office of the Secretary of Transportation." 49 
U.S.C. Section 1403 {c}. The Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vides that title to goods passes when agreed upon by the 
parties or upon delivery. In this case the result is the 
same whether you rely upon paragraph 5 of the Purchase 
Agreement or whether you rely upon Section 2-401{2} of the 
Uniform commercial Code. In either event title to the 
aircraft passed to the Respondent not later than the date of 
-5-
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delivery, October 20, 1977, {TR. 16-17). No documents 
affecting that title were on file with the F.A.A. prior to 
October 25, 1977. (Trial Courts Finding No. 3). Therefore, 
by the very language of the Federal Aviation Act quoted 
above, even assuming it preempts state law on the issue of 
prioritie~, the Trial Court was in error. 
The only claimed defect in the respondent buyer's 
title is two Security Agreements executed by Skyways to 
Cessna Finance Corporation and subsequently by Transwest to 
Cessna Finance Corporation for the sole specific purpose of 
facilitating the transfer of title to the buyer respondent. 
(TR.51-54). The last of these two security interests was 
released on November 21, 1977 (Trial Court's Finding No. 3), 
only 31 days after respondent took delivery of the aircraft. 
It was not until some fourteen months later that respondent 
notified appellant of his wish to rescind the contract. On 
the date that respondent took delivery of the aircraft, 
October 20, 1977, the appellant Flight School had per-
feet unencumbered title to the same. This conclusion is 
inescapable when analyzed in light of Section 9-307(1) of 
the Uniform Commercial Code {70a-9-307(1) U.C.A.) which pro-
vides as follows: 
A buyer in ordinary course of business 
(subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other than a 
person buying farm products from a person 
-6-
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engaged in farming operations takes free of a 
security interest created by his seller even 
though the security interest is perfected and 
even though the buyer knows of its existence. 
When Skyways purchased the aircraft from Cessna, Skyways 
executed a security agreement to Cessna Finance Corporation 
and at that point in time Skyways clearly did not have unen-
cumbered title. However, when Skyways sold the aircraft to 
Transwest, Transwest being a buyer in ordinary course of 
business took free of the security interest created by 
Skyways. In turn Transwest financed the aircraft by exe-
cuting a security agreement to Cessna Finance Corporation. 
Transwest then did not have unencumbered title. However, 
when Transwest sold the aircraft to the appellant Flight 
School in the ordinary course of business the Flight School 
took free of the security interest created by its seller 
Transwest. Pursuant to Section 9-307 u.c.c. this result 
would obtain even though the security interest had been (and 
it was not) filed with the FAA and even though the Flight 
School might have known (although there is no evidence in 
the record to so indicate) of the existence of either of the 
prior security agreements. Thus, appellant Flight School 
had good unencumbered title to the aircraft which it sub-
sequently transferred to the respondent. That this transfer 
was "rightful" within the meaning of Section 2-312 of the 
Uniform commercial Code is self evident because it was 
-7-
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Cessna itself who made delivery to the Flight School's 
buyer, the respondent herein. 
This result seems imminently clear and perpetuates 
the intent of the Uniform Commercial Code that a buyer in 
the ordinary course of business buying inventory from a 
dealer take free and clear of any security interest or 
encumbrance unknown to him. Such a result facilitates the 
intent of the Uniform Commercial Code to encourage the free 
flow of goods and to protect the unsuspecting consumer 
against encumberances held by commercial interests who are 
better able to protect themselves in such a setting. 
This result is further mandated by Section 2-403 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (Section 9-2-403 Utah Code 
Annotated) which provides as follows: 
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title 
which his transferor had or had power to 
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited 
interest acquires rights only to the extent 
of the interest purchased. A person with 
voidable title has power to transfer a good 
title to a good faith purchaser for value. 
When goods have been delivered under a tran-
saction of purchase the purchaser has such 
power even though 
(a) the transferor was deceived as to 
the identity of the purchaser, or 
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a 
check which is later dishonored, or 
(c} it was agreed that the transaction 
was to be a "cash sale," or 
-8-
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{d} the delivery was procured through 
fraud punishable as larcenous under 
the criminal law. 
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a 
merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives 
him power to transfer all rights of the 
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of 
business. 
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any 
acquiescence in retention of possession 
regardless of any condition expressed between 
the parties to the delivery or acquiescence 
and regardless of whether the procurement of 
the entrusting or the possessor's disposition 
of the goods have been such as to be larcenous 
under the criminal law. 
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods 
and of lien creditors are governed by the 
chapters on Secured Transactions {chapter 9), 
Bulk Transfers {chapter 6) and Documents of 
Title {chapter 7). {Emphasis Added.} 
In this case Cessna entrusted the aircraft through its chain 
of dealers to The Flight School and indeed made delivery 
directly to the Flight School's buyer, respondent Johnston. 
To hold that there was defect in Johnston's title as a 
result of the two security interests put in place solely for 
the purpose of faciltating the transfer of that title to 
Johnston is a ludicrous and inequitable result. 
Respondent Johnston's real and only concern 
throughout this entire transaction was the delay experienced 
in obtaining a certificate of registration from the FAA. 
There are three problems, however, in Johnston's reliance 
upon these delays in attempting to rescind the contract. 
-9-
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First, the delays were completely beyond the control of the 
appellant and any finding to the contrary is totally 
without support in the record. The respondent's own 
witness, Mr. Gene Battachio, owner of Transwest Aircraft 
Sales testified as to the difficulty experienced in this 
particular case. He related other experiences he was per-
sonally familiar with and testified it was not unusual to 
experience substantial delays in obtaining certificates of 
registration from the FAA. (TR. 54-57). 
Secondly, the certificate of registration is not a 
title document and does not evidence ownership. See 49 
u.s.c Section 140l(f) which provides: 
Registration shall not be evidence of 
ownership of aircraft in any proceeding in 
which such ownership by a particular person 
is, or may be, in issue. 
Finally, plaintiff Johnston has failed to plead any 
breach of the contract of sale based upon the delay in 
receiving the certificate of registration and has plead only 
that appellant Flight School breached its warranty by 
failing to convey good unencumbered title to respondent 
Johnston. The issue of the delays in obtaining a cer-
tificate of registration were never properly before the 
court and counsel for appellant Flight School continually 
objected throughout the trial to any evidence concerning 
-10-
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such delays. See counsel's opening statement and numerous 
objections throughout the transcript. 
CONCLUSION 
This is an equitable action seeking rescission of a 
contract for the sale of an aircraft commenced 15 months 
after plaintiff took delivery of that aircraft. To permit 
such a rescission on the ill-founded theories of respondent 
and the court below not only results in a grossly inequitable 
result in this particular case but also reeks havoc in 
the real commercial world of the aircraft industry. This 
court is urged to reverse the lower court and hold as a 
matter of law that the warranty of title was not breached. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
rank s. Warner 
WARNER, MARQUARDT & HASENYAGER 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Appellants. 
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1980, I mailed two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to 
John T. Anderson, Roe and Fowler, Attorneys for Respondent, 
340 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah~ postage 
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